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ISLAMIST ACTIVISM, REVOLUTION AND REGIME CHANGE IN EGYPT 
 
By Ewan Stein 
 
In the immediate wake of the 25 January 2011 uprising in Egypt tensions emerged 
between two basic Islamist political orientations. The first orientation may be 
identified as political activism, which embodies the strategy of participation in formal 
political activity by competing in elections, seeking to shape legislation and influence 
public debate at the national level, including by establishing political parties. The 
second orientation can be termed grassroots activism, and entails a focus through 
preaching, charity and educational activity on the informal and grassroots level.  
Prior to the uprising these divergent orientations mapped relatively clearly 
onto divisions between Islamist groups. Political activism was embraced by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which began participating in elections in 1984 by running 
candidates under the umbrella of the Wafd Party. The Wasat Party, which split from 
the Brotherhood in 1996 as the result of a combination of internal tensions and a 
government crackdown, embraced political activism as well. The Labour Party, 
having gravitated from socialism to Islamism in the context of its electoral alliance 
with the Brotherhood, also represented a manifestation of Islamist political activism. 
The Brotherhood had a strong grassroots dimension in addition to its political face, 
but the grassroots orientation was increasingly exemplified by ultraconservative Salafi 
networks, most especially the Alexandria-based Salafi Call (al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya), 
which castigated the Brotherhood for its participation in a formal political realm that 
was not underpinned by shariʿa. A third political orientation, violent jihadism, gained 
expression through a number of extremist groups, the largest of which was the Islamic 
Group (al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya), but had largely disappeared from the Egyptian scene 
by the end of the 1990s. 
Although there was differences of opinion and debates within each trend, an 
important part of what distinguished these Islamist groups from each other was their 
position vis-à-vis the appropriate mode of political action. Following the revolution 
intra-group cleavages came into the open and formalised as Islamist actors were 
forced to take stock of new circumstances and reconsider political strategies and 
approaches. Groups that were previously committed to a grassroots orientation 
 19 
established parties and entered the formal political arena for the first time. Such 
groups were no longer distinguishable according to their attitude towards formalised 
political participation, which for them had suddenly become the norm rather than the 
exception. However, in the wake of the Muslim Brotherhood’s abortive experience in 
power the pendulum appears to be swinging again toward grassroots preoccupations, 
with Islamist political activism having seemingly been exhausted. Yet even grassroots 
Islamism has an uncertain future, particularly as a fourth orientation—that of Islamist 
protest activism—gains traction. 
 
Islamism in Egypt prior to the uprising 
 
Prior to the 25 January 2011 uprising Islamist political activism was in crisis. The 
Muslim Brotherhood, which had performed strongly in the 2005 parliamentary 
elections by winning 20 percent of seats, failed to win a single one in November 2010 
after boycotting the runoffs in what was widely considered to be a blatantly rigged 
contest.
1
 The regime, keen to minimise the Brotherhood’s role in any post-Mubarak 
transition, steadily cracked down on the Brotherhood following its 2005 showing by 
arresting members and freezing funds. Islamism as a political project seemed to be 
unravelling. Within the Brotherhood, the accession of a hard-line ‘organisational’ 
man, Mohammed Badie, to the position of General Guide, and the marginalisation of 
key reformist figures like Abdul Munim Abu al-Futuh, signalled a shift away from 
electoral engagement and consensus politics and towards grassroots retrenchment, a 
more accommodationist stance vis-à-vis the regime and ideological rigidity.
2
  
The retreat from political activism, however, was also fraught with problems. 
Despite being Egypt’s most established non-state actor with an extensive national 
infrastructure and clear mobilisational capacity, the Muslim Brotherhood was losing 
ground to other political and religious forces. At the grassroots level the Brotherhood 
competed with ultraconservative networks of Salafi preachers that focussed on 
grassroots preaching and charitable works, and studiously avoided formal politics. 
Like the Brotherhood, the Salafi movement provided social safety nets and structures 
of belonging.
3
 It represented an alternative vehicle for low-risk religious expression 
and belonging for Egyptians of all classes, but perhaps most notably for the poor and 
rural-urban migrants uprooted from existing family and communal support networks. 
The Salafi Call began as a student movement in the 1970s and was part of the same 
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Islamist revival movement to which the Brotherhood belonged.  Among its leaders 
were those returning from exile in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Salafi Call 
was more of a loose network of shaykhs with their own followers than a ‘group’ as 
such, and Salafis in general opposed ‘group action’ (ʿamal jamaʿi) as a matter of 
principle.  Like other Islamist trends, the Salafi Call enjoyed a considerable degree of 
state tolerance during the 1980s.
 
 
One of the Brotherhood’s objectives since its re-emergence onto the Egyptian 
political scene in the 1970s and 1980s was to rebuild its following among the urban 
middle classes, the stratum that formed the backbone of the movement prior to 1954. 
This involved ideological ‘moderation’ (as associated with the reformist, so-called 
wasatiyya, trend in the 1980s) in order to make the idea of an Islamic state more 
palatable for outward-looking middle class Egyptians. The rebuilding process also 
involved organisational innovations to bring the movement out of clandestinity and 
render membership respectable and safe for this class.  
The Brotherhood’s progress in both these areas was slowed by the regime’s 
clampdown in 1995, which disproportionately targeted reformist elements within the 
movement.
4
 Joining the Muslim Brotherhood no longer seemed like such a safe 
option for devout urban middle class Egyptians in comparison with the less 
contentious idiom of Salafism or even the passive ‘pro-business’ piety promoted as a 
lifestyle choice by new preachers like Amr Khalid.
5
  
The third main orientation within Egyptian political Islam, violent jihadism, 
was more or less stamped out by the end of the 1990s. The Islamic Group (IG), along 
with smaller groups like the Jihad Organisation (Tanzim al-Jihad), abstained from 
formal political activity not only to focus on preaching and social work, but also to 
prepare for and engage in armed struggle to overthrow the regime. The war of 
attrition between the regime and jihadists had tilted decisively in favour of the former 
by 1997, with the Luxor massacre of that year representing the last real spurt of 
jihadist militancy.
6
 The imprisoned jihadist leaders published detailed recantations of 
their previous takfiri positions, leaving advocacy of violent anti-regime jihad to 
Egyptians outside of the country, most prominently Osama bin Laden’s deputy and 
former Jihad Organisation leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. As IG and Jihad Organisation 
leaders and members were gradually released from prison in the early 2000s the 
groups entered an already crowded Salafi public sphere. Their main contribution to 
public discourse was—as part of a regional chorus of ‘deradicalised’ jihadists—to 
 21 
articulate from the inside, an alternative to al-Qaeda’s ideology and strategy.7 But 
with the core membership aging and closely monitored, the prospects of rebuilding 
the IG as a mass opposition movement, violent or otherwise, appeared dim. Debates 
within the group around whether or not to formalise the IG’s political strategy through 
the formation of a political vehicle remained, until the fall of Mubarak, largely below 
the surface. 
Salafis, (ex-)jihadists and new preachers competed with the Brotherhood as 
vehicles for Islamist mobilisation. However, they could not be meaningfully 
described as oppositional to a regime that tolerated and encouraged them on the basis 
that they abstain from political contestation. It was the Brotherhood’s combining of 
grassroots support with political engagement that enabled it to claim the mantle of 
formal opposition.  
But new secular players were outstripping the Brotherhood as an oppositional 
force during the 2000s. The politics of opposition, which the Brotherhood had sought 
to advance via its presence in parliament and in the professional syndicates, were 
moving from these discredited formal arenas and into the streets, factories and the 
Internet. Largely non-ideological, cross-partisan movements like Kefaya mobilised 
among the urban middle classes on the issue of democracy.  Groups like the April 6 
youth movement formed in solidarity with workers striking over corrupt and unfair 
economic policies. Although some Muslim Brotherhood members joined Kefaya, as a 
whole the Brotherhood never overcame its longstanding antipathy toward labour 
activism and demonstrations against the regime.
8
 Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood 
acted at times as a means through which the state could control protests on ‘safe’ 
foreign policy issues such as opposition to the US invasion of Iraq.
9
As the Egyptian 
uprising of 2011 began, political Islamism appeared to have run its course. The 
Muslim Brotherhood was losing ground as a grassroots movement to the Salafis, and 
as an activist movement to Kefaya, April 6, and other new oppositional movements. 
 
Islamism in Egypt during and after the uprising 
 
The mass outpouring against the rule of Hosni Mubarak presented challenges and 
opportunities for all forms of political Islam in Egypt. All trends, with the exception 
of some of the more ‘activist’ (haraki) Salafis, joined the revolution on the back 
foot.
10
 The Brotherhood, whose thunder as a protest movement had already been 
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stolen by Kefaya and other activist oppositional groups, was trapped between either 
crossing a clear line in the sand by joining anti-Mubarak demonstrations (and inviting 
fierce regime retaliation if the revolution failed) or remaining passive and losing what 
minimal credibility it had among a newly politicised public. In the end the Brothers 
chose a middle path, joining the uprising on the 28 January’s ‘Friday of Rage’, but at 
the same time opening channels of communication with the regime in a bid to protect 
themselves and claim a stake in whatever political order might emerge.  
Salafis charted a similar course of delayed participation combined with 
reaching out to the regime. But for them the dilemma was yet more complex. 
Wholeheartedly endorsing the revolution would shatter the reputation for political 
passivity that had won them the approval of the Mubarak regime as a counterweight 
to the Muslim Brotherhood. Their participation would certainly lead to repression if 
the revolution failed. On the other hand, Salafi leaders feared that any political 
dividend accruing to the Brotherhood would be at their expense. If the Brotherhood 
was able to monopolise political power it, unlike Mubarak, would have no reason to 
nurture an Islamic societal movement like the Salafi Call. Such a movement would 
instead be viewed as a direct competitor with the Brotherhood’s own structures of 
mobilisation, patronage and influence in society. In the absence of an authoritarian 
protector like Mubarak the Salafis could not remain above the fray. 
The IG leaders viewed things differently still. The IG had no significant 
remaining national infrastructure that could pose a threat to, or be threatened by, the 
Muslim Brotherhood. As such the uprising offered first and foremost an opportunity 
to rebuild this infrastructure through political engagement under the wing of the 
Muslim Brotherhood as Egypt’s most powerful Islamist force. The widely assumed 
deal that those leaders had made with the security forces to secure their release from 
prison made it difficult for the IG to put itself forward as a revolutionary player, other 
than by rather tenuously painting the uprising as a continuation of its own jihad 
against Mubarak in the 1990s. The key author of what was known as the ‘revisions’ 
literature (in which the IG moderated its previous radical positions), Najih Ibrahim, 
explicitly exhorted Egyptians to respect the legitimacy of Mubarak’s rule during the 
early days of the uprising.
11
 Perhaps inevitably, the leadership team centred on 
Ibrahim, and Karim Zuhdi was pushed aside to make way for those less tainted by 
accusations of compromise and connivance. Among those who played a prominent 
role in this new team were Isam Dirbala, known to have had reservations about the 
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extent of the group’s mea culpa in the 2000s, and the newly released Abbud and Tariq 
Zumar. Both were hardliners who had not participated in the revisions process but 
who favoured formal political engagement.  
Whereas before the uprising the Brotherhood, Wasat and the Labour Party 
(frozen from 2000) comprised the spectrum of formalised Islamism, during 2011 all 
major Islamist trends established political parties to contest elections and help to 
shape the post-Mubarak political order. The fall of Mubarak represented a critical 
juncture that strengthened the influence and salience of those favouring formalisation 
within the Brotherhood, the Salafi movement and the jihadist trend. But paralleling 
the split within the IG, some Salafi shaykhs bemoaned the mistake, from both 
strategic and jurisprudential perspectives, that the Salafi Call was making by 
establishing the Nour Party.
12
 Divergences within the Muslim Brotherhood over the 
extent to which it should throw its weight behind the electoral process were also 
sharpening. 
In a bid to reassure Egypt’s revolutionary public and other Islamist and non-
Islamist political actors that it was not seeking to ‘hijack’ the revolution or 
monopolise power, the Muslim Brotherhood initially adopted a conciliatory approach 
to the transition, building on its pre-uprising experience of coalition building. It 
promised not to contest more than a third of seats in parliament and not to put forward 
a candidate for the presidency.
13
 But with the revolutionary movement running out of 
steam and maligned in the media, not just the military but also other ‘remnants’ of the 
old regime felt they could calm the streets without the assistance of the Brotherhood 
or other Islamist groups. The contradictory dynamics of the regime and the street 
exacerbated divisions within the Brotherhood. As the pillars of the regime grew in 
confidence through 2011 and 2012, the assessment of the situation changed for a 
narrow majority of the Brotherhood leadership, thus shifting the organisation’s 
political direction to a new ‘winner takes all’ approach. 
In the context of the evolving balance of forces, the Brotherhood’s inclusive 
strategy gave way to zero-sum politics, as did that of its erstwhile secular allies. The 
Brotherhood’s cross-party coalition collapsed before the 2011-2012 parliamentary 
elections. Its Freedom and Justice Party emerged strongest in the electoral outcome, 
followed by a Salafi list led by the Nour Party and including the IG’s Building and 
Development Party. Frustrated at being unable to form a government, and perhaps 
fearing (accurately) that the Islamist-dominated parliament would be dissolved, the 
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Brotherhood backtracked on its commitment not to field a presidential candidate. The 
Brotherhood’s decision to field a candidate was finally made by a very narrow margin 
(56 to 52 votes) when put to vote in the group’s Shura Council.14 
Islamists’ decisions to formalise their political presence soon after Mubarak’s 
ouster alienated them from a significant part of the revolutionary public. All the main 
groups strongly supported the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in its 
plan to amend, rather than replace, the constitution and proceed with early elections in 
2011. This led to accusations against Islamist groups of collusion with SCAF to end 
the revolution, leaving the backbone of the regime and the ‘deep state’ intact. In 
championing the holding of elections sooner rather than later, Islamists correctly 
banked on the fact that their name recognition, organisational capacity and grassroots 
presence would deliver them victory. The prevailing Islamist strategy was essentially 
to exploit popular pressure on the regime in order to formalise their political presence 
rather than to seek any kind of mandate from the revolutionary public for a process of 
genuine regime change. 
This instrumentalisation of the revolutionary opportunity arguably weakened 
the Islamist movement as a whole vis-à-vis the regime. The alliance between the 
Brotherhood and the Salafi Call was built on shaky ground. Although they were able 
to cooperate in order to help secure the election of the Brotherhood’s presidential 
candidate, Mohammed Morsi, they had run separate lists in the parliamentary 
elections and the Salafi group had endorsed Abdul Munim Abu al-Futuh, who had 
been expelled from the Brotherhood because of his decision to run for president in the 
first round. It was only when forced to choose between Morsi and the regime 
candidate Ahmed Shafiq that the Salafi Call backed the Brotherhood’s choice.  
Splits within the Salafi ranks also came into the open in the context of the 
presidential race. In particular, the candidacy of Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, the key 
figurehead of a new ‘revolutionary Salafism’ that set itself openly against the military 
regime and pushed for the application of shariʿa as a priority, posed a threat to the 
Salafi Call’s strategy of accommodation against the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
followers of Abu Ismail (the Hazemoon), the Salafi Front and other ‘activist’ Salafi 
formations embodied a rejection of instrumentalising revolutionary pressure in order 
to formalise political participation in favour of appropriating and embodying the 
revolutionary impulse itself. 
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This was as terrifying for the new ‘political Salafis’ as it was for the regime 
itself. The Salafi Call’s endorsement of Abu al-Futuh reflected its rivalry with the 
Brotherhood, but also its wariness of the implications of supporting Abu Ismail. The 
latter drew support from a dedicated group of followers, inspired many within the 
Salafi Call’s rank and file, and represented a potentially incendiary bridge between 
Islamists and the broader revolutionary public.
15
 As such, it came as something of a 
relief for the leadership of the Salafi Call when Abu Ismail was disqualified from the 
presidential race, sparing the group from more serious splintering.
16
  
During Morsi’s brief incumbency the Salafis continued to resist any 
Brotherhood dominance of the regime and state infrastructure with as much urgency 
as the secular National Salvation Front (NSF).The closer the Brotherhood appeared to 
be to formalising its control and ‘Ikhwanising’ the state, the more the Salafis of the 
Salafi Call and Nour Party sought to balance its apparently hegemonic aspirations. 
This meant forming alliances against the Brotherhood with the NSF and, as came to 
pass, the military. Ironically, given its reluctance to build a constituency within the 
revolutionary movement itself, Morsi’s main source of support outside of the 
Brotherhood came from the Hazemoon and other revolutionary Salafi formations.
17
 
The electoral approach, which had failed to enable to Brotherhood to consolidate 
power at the state level, was giving way to increasingly antagonistic politics of street 
protest that pitted the Brotherhood and Salafi youth against a ‘liberal’ protest 
movement and the police. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was thus isolated at the level of the state and, it 
turned out, overwhelmed on the streets as the large-scale popular mobilisation 
organised by the Rebel (Tamarod) campaign gathered steam in June 2013. The 
Brotherhood failed to convince the protest movement that it had any revolutionary 
aspirations or potential, particularly in comparison to the more robust and 
uncompromising alternatives being advanced by Abu Ismail and others. Being also 
unable or unwilling to pursue inclusive politics at the state level, the Brothers found 
themselves with nowhere to turn as millions of Egyptians clamoured for Morsi’s 
removal.  
Political naiveté and overreach offer a partial explanation for the 
Brotherhood’s predicament, but a more fundamental factor was the recovery of the 
old regime following the challenge of 25 January. This recovery meant that the 
pressure from below generated by the initial uprising, which had suddenly made the 
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Brotherhood valuable to SCAF, dissipated. The Brotherhood was thus convinced that 
it had to grab power while it still could. Additionally, from the Brotherhood’s 
perspective there was little reason to trust either a Salafi movement that had been 
nurtured by Mubarak and had no problem compromising with authoritarian rule, or a 
rather paranoid secular opposition that had no popular base and thus depended on 
state support for its political survival. 
The 3 July coup ushered in the most repressive period in Egypt’s modern 
history.
18
 In the wake of Morsi’s ouster the goal of the generals appears to be to the 
permanent suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood as a player in Egyptian politics 
and society. Brotherhood and Islamist leaders have been detained in waves of arrests 
that swept up not only hardliners, but also ‘moderate’ Islamists like Wasat Party 
leader Abu Elela Mady. Whereas Mubarak came down hardest on those seeking to 
expand the formal dimensions of the Brotherhood’s activity, the post-coup leadership, 
centred on the military and security apparatus, appears bent on decimating its 
grassroots activities as well. 
In this vendetta the military rulers have been abetted by the Salafi Call and 
most secular parties. Many Salafis, both rank and file and shaykhs, sympathise with 
Morsi and baulk at the military’s brutal treatment of protesters. But the Salafi Call and 
the Nour Party were quick to fall into line behind the generals following Morsi’s 
removal, supporting Sisi’s ‘roadmap’ and hoping for a seat at the new table. The Nour 
Party attempted to atone for this apparent betrayal of the Islamist cause by ensuring 
the new constitution retained at least some of the flavour of the 2012 ‘Islamist’ 
constitution. The attempt to preserve Article 219, which elaborates on the ‘principles’ 
of shariʿa stipulated in Article 2, foundered, however, within a predominantly secular 
drafting committee.  
In contrast to the Nour Party, Islamist political forces that backed Morsi when 
he was in power have joined the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy in the 
politics of street protest. In the past, the dividing line within the Islamist movement 
was on whether or not to engage politically. Now a new line of fissure has opened up 
between Islamist actors that back continued street protests and those that favour a 
return to grassroots activism, combined with some sort of compromise or 
reconciliation with the military. These new distinctions, as before, run within rather 
than between the groups. For example, while the IG and its Building and 
Development Party strongly support Morsi, one of the historic leaders of the IG, 
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Fouad al-Dawalibi, formed the al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya Reform Front in February 
2014.  Bringing together those leaders (including Ibrahim and Zuhdi) that were 
sidelined after the revolution, the Reform Front endorses the roadmap put in place by 
Sisi’s government and calls for dissolving the Building and Development Party and 
returning to the Jamaʿa’s true calling of daʿwa and social work.19 
The National Alliance to Support Legitimacy, which was set up to oppose the 
coup and campaign for Morsi’s reinstatement, has attracted the support of smaller 
Salafi groupings such as the Salafi Front, the Hazemoon, and the IG. These groups, 
alongside the Brotherhood youth, seek to rekindle a degree of revolutionary 
legitimacy in order to return to the pre-coup status quo ante. This new Islamist protest 
movement shares a unity of goals, if not strategies, with a steadily re-emerging 
jihadist trend that has exacted a heavy toll since the July 2013 coup.
20
 As the security 
crackdown continues it is not unreasonable to expect that the Islamist protest 
movement, to the extent it survives, will further radicalise. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Of all the Islamist formations discussed above, the Salafi Call has emerged strongest 
from the coup despite its inability to inject Islamism into the new constitution. The 
Muslim Brotherhood may be finished as a formal political actor, with the 2011-2013 
phase perhaps representing the final twitch of a near decade-long decline. What 
distinguishes the current phase from previous ones, however, is that the Sisi regime is 
bent on extinguishing the Muslim Brotherhood as a quietist phenomenon too. This 
does not necessarily bode well for the future of the Salafi Call. If the Brotherhood’s 
infrastructure collapses completely, the utility for the regime of Salafism as an 
independent social movement and counterweight will be diminished. Sisi’s solution to 
filling the Islamist void appears to be a combination of Islamic charismatic legitimacy 
(at least one shaykh has likened him to a prophet) and the greater institutionalisation 
of religion via al-Azhar and the Ministries of Religious Endowments and Social 
Solidarity.
21
  
But the long-term success of such strategies will require significant resources 
and/or populist policy successes that may prove elusive for the regime. Even if 
grassroots retrenchment, and to a lesser extent jihadism, has been vindicated at the 
expense of electoral Islamism by the fate of Morsi’s administration, the causes of 
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discontent that led to the 25 January uprising have not gone away, and the continued 
vigour of the anti-coup movement suggests that it may be the protesting, as opposed 
to political or grassroots, face of political Islam that is being forged in the post-July 
2013 period. Although Islamist protesters are not alone in opposing the coup, and nor 
are they the only ones to have suffered at the hands of the security force for 
protesting, they have as yet failed to tap into the kind of more generalised discontent 
that underpinned the mass uprisings of 25 January 2011 and 30 June 2013.
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